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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE ST AT.E OF UTAH 
-vs.-
Plaintiff-Appellant I VIVIAN MEIER, 
MERRILL SOREN CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant-Respondent 
Case 
No. 9855 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injury arising out of an 
intersection collision between the Plaintiff driving an auto-
mobile owned by her father and the Defendant driving a 
truck owned by the Sevier School District. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a v,erdict and judg-
ment for the Defendant, Plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment of the Lower 
Court and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arose out of an intersection collision which 
occurred on the 19th day of November, 1960 at a point 
where First South Street and Second East Street intersect 
in Richfield, S,evier County, Utah. Vivian Meier, Plaintiff, 
was driving an automobile north on Second East Street and 
had proceeded into the intersection when the automobile 
she was driving was struck by a vehicle being driven by 
Merrill Soren Christensen. Vivian Meier suffered serious 
injuries as a result of the collision, and an a c t i on was 
brougtht to recover for the injuries she had suffered and 
resulting expens,es which have been incurred by reason of 
the accident. 
The matter was tried before the Honorable Ferdinand 
Erickson, District Judge sitting with a jury on the 23rd and 
24th days of January, 1963. The jury returned a verdict 
of no cause of action, and from this verdict and the judg-
ment thereon the Plaintiff now appeals. 
POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL 
1. The District Judge erred in commenting on 
Plaintiff's evidence and extensively examining a 
witness called by Plaintiff, which acts of the Court 
were highly prejudicial. 
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2. The Court erred in failing to accurately instruct the 
jury as to the question of contributory negligence, if any, 
on the part of the Plaintiff, and further failed to accurately 
instruct as to the question of the Plaintiff's contributory 
negligence, if any, being a proximate cause of her injuries. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The District Judge erred in commenting 
on Plaintiff's ,evidence and extensively examining a 
witness called by Plaintiff, which acts of the Court 
were highly prejudicial. 
It is realized a trial judge in a jury case has a difficult 
task before him. He must have latitude in the conduct of 
a trial in order to meet the various circumstances and situa-
tions which arise during the course of the trial. However, 
a District Judge must conduct a trial in such a manner that 
it will not prejudice the rights of the parties, especially 
should he r,efrain from any remark which would in any way 
influence the jury.1 
A trial judge has power within proper limits to ex-
amine witnesses for the purpose of ,eleciting material facts. 
The limits of this examination, however, do not permit an 
extensive ,examination which would u n d u 1 y impress the 
jurors with the judge's opinion of the testimony or of the 
witness testifying.2 Such conduct on the part of a judge 
invades the province of a trial jury which is empaneled and 
sworn to try and determine by their verdict questions of 
fact. 3 Appellate Courts have unanimously held any action 
by a District Judge which reflects on the testimony of a 
witness and which gives testimony an undue prominence by 
I 53 Am Jur Trials Sec. 76 
2 Aero Enterprises vs. Walker 228 P2D 811, 123 Colo. 113 
3 78-46-4, UCA 1953 
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either minimizing or exaggerating its value constitutes re-
versable error.! 
It has been uniformly held that conduct of a judge trying 
a case must b,e such that it will be fair to both sides. A de-
parture from this fundamental requirement has been held 
to be reversable error.2 Prejudicial ,error has been held to 
be committed if a judge's comments and remarks to a wit-
ness indicate that the Court had prejudged the case, or that 
he thinks the witness is not telling the truth, or that his 
statements are inaccurate.3 It has further been uniformly 
held that comments on the evidence which go to the weight 
and sufficiency thereof are prejudicial error and invade the 
province of the jury.4 
Keeping in mind the foregoing holding, we quote from 
the transcript of evidence to demonstrate the ,error commit-
ted by the District Judge and the highly prejudicial eff~ct 
it had on the Plaintiff's case. As we briefly stated, this 
action arose out of an inters.ection collision between an auto-
mobile being driven by the Plaintiff and an automobile be-
ing driven by the Defendant. The most crucial issue of fact 
for the jury to find was the exact point of impact. To estab-
lish the point of impact the Plaintiff called a police offi~r 
who investigated the accident. The officer's testimony was 
offered to assist the jury in locating the exact point of im-
pact and further, to demonstrate the Plaintiff's favored 
position in the intersection. Her position was that of being 
on the r i g h t at the time of entering the intersection, 
(R 131) and also that of entering the intersection first. 
(Plaintiff's exhibit 1; R 75, L 18-24; R 92, L 16-29). 
1 See Annotation 127 ALR 1389 
2 Am Jur Appeal & Error 1052 
3 Am Jur 1052 -Appeal & Error 1053 & 1054 
4 Am Jur Appeal & Error - 1055 
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Leslie Jensen, Richfield City Chief of Police, testified 
at some length concerning the investigation he made at the 
scene of the accident. (R 119 through 181). 
The officer testified that he was able to identify the 
point of impact by locating the debris in the intersection. 
The debris consisted of glass, dirt, mud, and other material 
which had fallen from the cars. He stated he was able to 
cross check the point of impact and to establish it definitely 
by identifying scuff marks left by each of the four wheels 
of each of the automobiles. (R 135; R 136; R 138, L 19 
through 30; R fl39, L 1 through 18; R 142, L 12 through 19; 
R 178; R 179; and R 180). The officer stated that as the 
cars came together each of the cars was forced to s I i d e 
sideways, and though there were no brake marks left by 
either car, he was able to establish a marking from each of 
the four wheels of each automobile by the scuff marks left 
at the time of impact. He said that he took a piece of chalk 
and chalked each of the four wheels on each automobile and 
by cross checking the position of the wheels at the time of 
impact with the pile of debris, he was able to ~establish an 
exact point of impact. The point of impact the officer 
established showed the front of the Plaintiff's automobile 
was nearly through the intersection. 
The District Judge took exception to the officer's state-
ment that a point of impact could be established with cer-
tainty. (R 138, L 14 through 18; R 154, L 2 through 11). 
The Court proceeded to make such an examination of the 
witness as to indicate to the jurors the officer's statements 
were open to serious question and that they were inaccur-
ate. The Court also made comments in which he stated 
positively that a point of impact could not be established 
with certainty. 
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The emphasis added by underscoring certain portions 
of the statements and questions of the Court have b e ~ n 
added by us and were not a part of the Court Reporter's 
transcript. 
Commencing at Page 137 of the record, line 21, the 
Court states as follows: 
THE COURT: Now, of cours,e, that contemplates a 
factor on two moving objects, for example, two mov-
ing objects and we must assume, of course, both 
were moving at the time. 
MR. OLSEN: That's right. 
THE COURT: And they collide or meet. We have 
every right to believe under natural law that the 
position of those vehicles is going to be altered some-
what from their direction or course. At the first 
moment, for example that thes,e vehicles are moving 
they are not going to come to a direct stop. I think 
we have a right to assume that. Would that debris, 
which he finds, the glass or, I think he mentioned 
the-
WITNESS: The mud or dirt or whatever you call it. 
THE COURT: The mud or dirt or whatever hap-
pens to fall, would that-this debris-with the ve-
hicle still moving, would that debris be where the 
impact came or would it be scattered along some 
distance? 
MR. OLSEN: I would be glad to have you ask that 
question of the officer if you would like to, the way 
they cross check on that problem. I think it might 
be well for the jury to understand that. 
THE COURT: The only r.eason I ask that is that in 
the Court's judgment it is rather difficult to say 
just wbe~e· these two automobiles or two moving 
obj,ects came together, both moving. If one were 
stationary, for example, why-
The foregoing questions and comments focused t h e 
jury's attention on the importance of the problem and also 
suggested the Court's opinion on the question of fact pre-
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sented. With this background, the examination and com-
ments which followed were disastrous to the Plaintiff's case. 
Continuing at page 139, line 21 of the record: 
THE COURT: Well, of course, it somewhat answers 
the question that was in the Court's mind. The only 
thoug.ht the court had, of course, was whether or not 
these visible things on the highway, the things he 
m~entioned, the dirt, the glass, the debris, was proper 
1evidence of the position of the cars at the time of 
impact. If a vehicle is traveling north on Second 
East, at that intersection, another vehicle is travel-
ing East on First South and the two meet, the car 
traveling north-it would seem the car trav,eling 
north, the Oldsmobile was hit somewhere near the 
front door, would that not have a tendency to push 
that car farther ,east? 
WITNESS : It would. 
THE COURT: Now when would those marks, the 
tire marks become visible-immediately or would 
they extend over a little period of time? 
A. They scraped the dust that's on the road. You 
know there is a coat of dust that's on there and it 
scrapes down ther,e to the oil. It takes the dust off 
and leaves a black mark- tire prints. 
Q. Could those marks be left immediately at the 
time of impact? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the time thes,e forces apply? 
A. It would. 
MR. OLSEN: Do you have any further questions, 
Your Honor? 
BY THE COURT: What kind of marks do you refer 
to? What kind of marks would be left on the high-
way? I mean by the tires. 
WITNESS: By the tires, they are generally kind 
of wide and sometimes they are narrow and mayb,e 
they will go quite a little ways, length ways, like 
they will be the width of the tires that is on the oil. 
THE COURT: Would it always follow that where 
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two vehicles meet as these two vehicles did, there 
would be some tir,e marks? 
A. Most of the time. 
Q. BY THE COURT: Could not one car, for ex-
ample, move without any appreciable evidence of a 
tire mark? 
A. Well, generally when ther,e is an impact like 
that, both cars leave a mark. 
THE COURT: Now, may I ask you, what mark 
would the car traveling east, like the pick-up truck 
in this case, would there be any evidence ? 
WITNESS : There would be a small piece f r o m 
either side, whichever way it went to, there would 
be some marks. 
THE COURT: Now you got on the car that is trav-
eling east, you've got a wheel running in the course 
or dir,ection it's traveling on? 
WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Would that wheel tend to show a 
greater mark on the surface of the highway, than a 
wheel that is being slipped along? 
WITNESS: Well, no, the car that's sliding along 
will make the widest mark. 
THE COURT: And what marks did you observe so 
far as the vehicle traveling ,east on First South, that 
would be the pick-up truck? 
A. Well, it had marks so you could tell where it 
slid on the oil. 
THE COURT: Did you identify those marks and 
measure them? 
A. Well, I just measured from there to the pile of 
debris that was laying in the middle of the road at 
the intersection. 
THE COURT: That's all I have. 
Q. The tire marks you are talking about are they 
brake marks or scuff marks from a car knocked 
sideways? 
A. Well, if they've got their brakes on or if they 
let it go, it will make marks anyway, with the brakes 
on or off. 
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In order to demonstrate to the jury the officer's meas-
urements and their significance, a plat was prepared for the 
Plaintiff by a registered land survyor. The plat was admit-
ted into evidence upon stipulation of counsel as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1. It show,ed the intersection drafted to scale and 
also showed each of the permanent markers used by the 
officer to fix the point of impact. The officer first located 
the point of impact by the method we have described, and 
then measured from the point of impact to permanent 
markers at or near the inter section. (R 142, L 23, R 143, 
L 15 through 24). The officer stated the point of impact 
could b,e re-established by measuring back from the monu-
ments. It is clearly seen the point of impact could be re-
established by measuring back from the permanent mark-
ers the same distance as was shown in the officer's report 
and then by making arcs after each measurement. The arcs 
would cross in the street at one point, which point would be 
the point of impact. 
The District Judge continued to undermine the testi-
mony of the officer and to indicate the methods he had used 
to gather his evidence and the manner in which he had 
made measurements weren't accurate and were subj,ect to 
challenge. The examination continued (R 152, L 15) : 
THE COURT: Let me say that I think it is prob-
ably confusing. After all the only way to deter-
mine, it seems to me, the point of impact, is take 
that area for example, which is legally described as 
the intersection, from the sidewalk on the north 
border,ed by the sidewalk on the west by the side-
walk on the south, by the sidewalk on the east. Now 
that area comprises your intersection. 
MR. OLSEN: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now, ther,e is a confined, limited 
area. Now if per chance an accident happens with-
in that area, we know if, for example, a car is travel-
ing east into that intersection, he has got to be for 
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example on the south side of that highway, hasn't 
he? And we know if a vehicle is traveling, for ex-
ample, north on that or into that sam.e intersection, 
it in turn must be on the east side of that highway. 
Now it appears to me that the only safe way to de-
termine the point of impact, if it can be done, and 
if you can do that, is all these other factors, but as-
suming that you can go up there and see some debris 
and say, "Well, that must be it." That's about what 
we're doing. It seems to me that the measurements 
should be made within the intersection and not, for 
example, from a telephone pole out here to a certain 
point or from somewhere else. Now, I don't know 
why we've got a difference of distance between 35 
and 32 feet. What's the significance of that thirty-
five feet? 
The examination continued further (R 155, L 5): 
THE COURT: Of course, I'm aware of that, the only 
thing what w,e are trying to do here, Tex, with the 
aid of this jury and this court, is to fix, as near as 
we can fix, what someone said or where someone 
said the impact came, the officer who inv,estigated. 
MR. OLSEN: That's right. 
THE COURT: Now he's got to have a square here, 
as I say bounded by sidewalks and corners. Now 
he has got to determine, for example, where that 
impact is before he can start measuring from the 
telephone pole out to some particular point. 
MR. OLSEN: That's right. 
THE COURT: And from some flume to some other 
point, so the essential thing is the point which this 
witness testified, which may or may not be. It's his 
judgment that this probably was wher,e it happen-
ed, so it appears to me that instead of running lines 
from given point, the ressential thing, the thing he 
had to do is find out where those cars collided in his 
judgment. 
MR. OLSEN: That's just exactly what he's talking 
about. 
THE COURT: Now if he could draw a square I 
think he could do that just as easily as anybody 
else--
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. OLSEN: And he's-
THE COURT: And fix, for example, the center of 
that square in relation to the accident to the center 
of the square. 
Continuing R 156, L 25: 
THE COURT: Let me ask the witness one question: 
What was the purpose of making this measure-
m·ent? That would be from looking north now, from 
the west end of the culvert, running in a northeast-
erly direction thirty-fiv:e feet? 
WITNESS: Well, you try to take-you've got three 
or four points you measure from, so you will have 
something to go by. 
THE COURT: From thes:e points you measure from 
the known- you call it a monument-from this cul-
vert here, you measure up how far? Y o u w e n t 
thirty-five feet. Why thirty-five feet? 
WITNESS: Well, that's the center of the impact. 
THE COURT: Well, that would be in this quadrant 
here, would it not? These two lines indicate the 
center-that would be the center, I assume, of the 
intersection? 
WITNESS: Yes, right in this area here (indicat-
ing.) 
THE COURT: Well, this line-that's why I want 
to know why this thirty-five foot measure? 
WITNESS: Well, you got to have your measure-
ments or you can just have one. But it is hetter to 
have two or three measurements, if one or the oth-
ers a!ie to be moved, like a telephone pole, they come 
and move it or they move a culvert out. 
THE COURT: Of course, you could take m.easure-
ments, for example, and you could literally locat·e 
that accident in any quadrant, .if you are just going 
to just tak.e a measurement, that's my point. 
The Court not only commented on the method of locat-
ing the point of impact, but inaccurately informed the wit-
ness and the jury that by using the investigation methods 
11 
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of the witness the accident could b:e located in any quadrant 
of the intersection. (R 157, L 20). This was not only a 
prejudicial comment, but was an inaccurate assumption of 
the Court. 
The Court then continued: (R 157, L 27) 
THE COURT: I want him to testify where in his 
judgment this accident happened. In what particu-
lar quadrant, and I t~ink that is som,ething the jury 
should know on this thing. 
It is apparent the for,egoing question indicated to the 
jury that the Court did not believe the testimony which had 
already been given by the witness and the Court was going 
to require the witness to give information to the jury which 
would have some value to them. 
Continuing (R 158, L 14 through 19) : 
THE COURT: Well, it is in his judgment, that's 
where he belived it was, just a little north of the 
center line. 
A. Just a little over the center line. 
THE COURT: I doubt that we can illuminate the 
matter much. We have got rather confused, I know. 
The last comment of the Court indicated to the jury 
the officer was very confused in his testimony and it was 
impossible to go farther with the witness to illuminate the 
matter or to identify the point of impact. This assumption 
was contrary to fact since it appears from an examination 
of the officer's testimony that he was v;ery specific as to the 
point of impact. However, even if the comments of the 
Court welie factual the judge would not have had the privi-
lege of invading the province of the jury and commenting 
upon questions of fact and thereby emphasizing his opinions 
ther1eon. 
The damaging remarks of the Court concerning the un-
reliability of the officer's testimony and the impossibility 
12 
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of establishing a d,efinite point of impact would be sufficient 
to prejudice a jury and cause the jury to discount or disre-
gard the officer's testimony. This prejudice together with 
the instructions given by the Court, would leave the jury 
no alternative but to return a verdict against the Plaintiff, 
as was done. 
Point 2. The Court erred in failing to accurately in-
struct the jury as to the question of contributory 
negligence, if any, on the part of the Plaintiff, and 
further failed to accurately instruct as to the ques-
tion of the Plaintiff's contributory negligence, if 
any, being a proximate cause of her injuries. 
The Plaintiff entered the intersection in which the col-
lision occurred from the right, and the only logical conclu-
sion which can be reached is the Plaintiff was also first in 
the intersection. (Plaintiff's exhibit 1; R 75, L 78-24; R 92, 
L 16-29). 
Under these circumstances Plaintiff was entitled to in-
structions to the jury concerning her favored position in 
the intersection. By reason of Section 41-6-72, UCA, 1953, 
and also by reason of a local extension of the statute adopt-
ed by Richfield City under Richfield City Ordinances, 1953, 
Section 308, it is specifically provided a driver of a motor 
vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of 
way to a vehicle approaching the intersection f r o m t h e 
right. It is also provided a driver shall yield to the vehicle 
first entering the intersection. 
The statute and ordinan~e provide definite rules for 
intersections in order to make movements of traffic both 
practical and safe. The rules established reiterate general 
traffic rules adopted throughout the United States a n d 
cited in 2 Blashfield Cyclopedia of American Law and Prac-
13 
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tice, permanent edition, Sections 991 to 994. The general 
rule commented upon is that the vehicle entering the cross-
ing first has the right of way over the second vehicle com-
ing from another direction, unless under the standard of 
du;e care, the driver should not proceed because to do so 
would hazard a collision. In the present case, even if there 
is doubt as to which automobile entered the intersection 
first, the rule concerning the driver approaching from the 
right applies and gives the Plaintiff the right of way. The 
Plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to an instruction which 
clearly showed the jury the Plaintiff had the right to r,ely 
on her favored position. 
In the well reasoned case of Martin vs. Stevens (121 
Utah, 848, 243 P2D, 747) the following language was used: 
"Although Plaintiff had the right of way under both 
rules above r,eferred to, yet there developed upon 
him the duty of due care in observing the other traf-
fic. But in doing so, he had the right to assume, 
and to rely and act on the assumption that others 
would do likewise; he was not obligated to anticipate 
either the other drivers would drive negligently, nor 
fail to accord him his right of way, until in the exer-
cise of due care, he observed, or should have observ-
ed, something to warn him that the other driver was 
driving negligently or would fail to accord him his 
right of way. If this principle is not clear in the 
earlier Utah cases, it is firmly -established by the 
more recent expressions of this Court." 
The Court also discussed the Utah case of Hess vs. 
Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 PD2 510, where the Plaintiff 
failed to see the Defendant's ambulance coming into the in-
tersection from the w;est. It was held that even though 
Plaintiff was negligent in not seeing the ambulance, the 
question as to whether his negligence proximately contribu-
ted to the cause of his injury was properly submitted to the 
jury. It was held the jury could find it to be within the 
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driver's duty of due care to assume the driver of the other 
vehicle would obey the stop sign, and that he was entitled 
to proceed through the intersection until it became appar~ 
ent to him the ambulance would not stop. 
In the cas:e of Lowder vs. Holley 120 Utah 231, 233 
P2d 350, the Plaintiff failed to observe t h e Defendant's 
vehicle approaching from the right. There was ~vidence 
from which it could be found that at the time the Plaintiff 
was about ready-to enter the intersection the Defendant 
was 250 feet away. It was held the question of whether the 
Plaintiff's failure to s:ee the defendant approach was negli-
gence was a question of fact. It was also observed that had 
the Plaintiff seen the Defendant it could be found to he 
within his duty of due care to assume the Defendant would 
yield him the right of way. 
In accordance with the Utah holdings cited above the 
Plaintiff submitted Plaintiff's proposed instruction No. 4 on 
the question of negligence which reads as follows: 
You ar,e instructed that if the Plaintiff, V i v i a n 
Meier, was at the time of and immediately prior to 
the time of the accident driving her automobile into 
and across the intersection of First South and Sec-
ond East Streets in a lawful and proper manner, she 
had the right to assume and rely and act on the as-
sumption that others would do likewise; she was not 
obliged to anticipate either that other drivers would 
drive negligently nor fail to accord her right of way 
until in the exercise of due care she observed or 
should have observed something to warn her that 
the other driver was driving negilgently or would 
fail to accord her the right of way. 
The District Court erred in r,efusing Plaintiff's instruc-
tion, and as a substitute therefor minimized the Plaintiff's 
position by giving instruction No. 10 (R 21) which states as 
follows: 
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When the law says that one person has the right of 
way over another, it simply means that such person 
has the immediate privilege of occupying the space 
in question and other persons must yield to such 
person. 
The foregoing instruction appears to riequire that a 
party actually possess or be in a particular s p a c e before 
he has the privilege of claiming the right of way. The 
term "immediate privilege of occupying" appears to require 
that the party be in the particular space as though parked 
in that space in order to have any prior claim or right which 
would require the other party to yield. The instruction is 
not broad enough to allow the party having the prior right 
the privilege of continuing on and crossing the intersection. 
Instruction No. 11 shown at page 22 of the Record 
reads as follows: 
The fact that one has the right of way, if such be 
the fact, does not excuse him from the exercisie of 
ordinary care to avoid causing an accident. 
The two instructions cited above not only fail to explain 
the favored position of the Plaintiff, but, in fact, negate it. 
Under the rulings in Hess vs. Robinson supra; Lowder 
vs. Holley supra; and Poulson vs. Manis, 241 P2D 152 121 
Utah 269, the Plaintiff was also entitled to a specific in-
struction concerning proximate caus,e. Even if the jury con-
cluded that the Plaintiff failed to keep a lookout to the east, 
Plaintiff was entitled to an instruction which could permit 
the jury to find that this failur,e, although negligence, may 
not have proximately caused the collision. (See Plaintiff's 
offered instruction No. 5 which was rejected.) The jury 
was 1entitled to be instructed that the Plaintiff, within the 
limits of reasonable care, could have assumed the Defen-
dant would yield the right of way. 
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The general instruction on proximate cause and negli-
gence g i v e n by the Lower Court, instruction No. 15-A 
(R 27), would mean nothing to the jury, and for this reason 
was objected to by the Plaintiff. 
The error complained of was compounded by instruc-
tion No. 18 found at page 33 of the Record which is as fol-
lows: 
If you find from the evidence that Vivian M,eier 
knew or should have known, under the circumstan-
ces, that the car driven by Merrill Soren Christensen 
was not going to yield the right of way, then Vivian 
Meier had a duty to use reasonable car,e to avoid a 
collision; if you find she failed to do so, then she is 
negligent. 
Bullock vs. Luke 198 P2D 350. 
The addition of the case citation for the jury drew 
undue attention to the instruction and also set it apart and 
thereby gave it more weight than the other instructions. 
This instruction taken with instructions 10 and 11 s,eemed 
to place the absolute obligation on Vivian Meier of knowing 
the Defendant would fail to yield the right of way, and 
further placed the obligation upon Vivian Meier of avoiding 
the collision. The instruction was misleading in that it 
placed the burden of avoiding the accident upon the Plain-
tiff who held the right of way. It was also ,erroneous in that 
it failed to explain that even if Vivian Meier were found to 
be negligent in failing to s,ee the Defendant, this negligence 
may not have proximately caused the accident, as we have 
already discussed. The instructions taken together appear 
to inform the jury that the Plaintiff was negligent by rea-
son of the fact she was involved in an intersection collision. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion w1e respectfully submit the acts of the 
District Judge in commenting upon Plaintiff's evidence and 
also in extensively examining one of Plaintiff's witnesses 
wer~e highly prejudicial. 
In connection with Point 2 involving the instructions 
given by the District Court, we also respectfully submit the 
instructions did not accurately instruct the jury concerning 
the law of the State of Utah on intersection collisions. The 
instructions, in fact, gave the Plaintiff an insurmountable 
burden to overcome. In our opinion the instructions were 
such that it would have been impossible for the jury to find 
for the Plaintiff, since the instructions left the jury with 
only one conclusion to reach, and that was that the Plaintiff 
was negligent at the time of the collision, and for this rea-
son, she could not recover. 
For all of the reasons set forth, the Appellant requests 
that the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the Lower 
Court be rev~ersed and the matter be remanded for a new 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted. 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
Attorneys at Law 
Richfield, Utah 
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